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ADMIRALTY-JOINDER IN LIBEL OF SHIP AND OWNER-RIGHT TO
PROCEED IN REMt FOR INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH.-A.'s personal
representative libelled a tug for injuries received in a collision by A., a
passenger on the tug, from which death resulted in about ten minutes. A
local statute gave to the personal representative a cause of action for
death caused by negligence, but gave no lien or privilege upon the offending thing. The original libel was amended by proceeding in liersonant
against the owners of the tug, as -well as in z rem against the tug. Held
(affirming the decree below): (I) that the joinder of ship and owner
violated Admiralty Rules 12 to 2o inclusive; and that if the amendment was
treated as an independent libel in fiersonavn, it was defective in failing to
aver that the respondents were owners; (2) that since the local law gave
no lien, a proceeding in rem could not be maintained in the Admiralty,
and, as there was no averment that sufferings of deceased were not
practically contemporaneous with death, it was unnecessary to decide
whether or not a right in rem as to them passed to the personal representatives under the local statute: The Corsair, Mr. Justice BROWN, May
16, 1892 (145 U. S., 3 3 5).-G. IV. P.
RETURN OF FUNDS WRONGFULLY WITHthe cashier and afterward the
president of the Albion Bank, engaged in stock speculation, and, for his
own purposes, drew in favor of his brokers upon his bank's balance with
its New York correspondent. The brokers from time to time returned to
the New York bank sums to be credited to the Albion, which deposits
were reported in the usual way. Upon the insolvency of the latter, the
receiver sued the brokers, who claimed credit for sums returned, although
no officer of the Albion Bank (except the defaulter A.) had received
actual notice of these deposits. Held (reversing the Court belbw) : that
it was at least a question for the jury whether A.'s fellow officers, in the
exercise of reasonable care, could have ascertained that these deposits
had been made to the credit of their bank, and whether they would have
accepted them as a return of moneys to it: Kissam v. Anderson, Mr.
Justice BREWER, May 16, 1892 (145 U. S., 435).-G. W. P.
BANK-CREDIT

FOR

DRAWN-NOTICE TO Co-DIRECTORS.-A.,

BANK-SPECIAL DEPOSIT-TRUST.-A banker became surety upon
an appeal bond in a suit against an accident association. To indemnify
him against loss the accident association deposited with him a sum of
money, receiving a certificate of deposit stating the object of the deposit.
This sum was paid by a check of the association, and with its knowledge
the check was collected by the banker and the proceeds were used by him
in his business. Upon the insolvency of the banker it was held that
the deposit was a general one, and, therefore, no trust was created
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which would entitle the association to recover its' amount in full in pref
erence to claims of other creditors: Mutual Accident Association of the
Northwest v. Jacobs, Supreme Court of Illinois, "May12, 1892, CRAIG, J.
(31 N. E. Rep., 4r4).-H. L. C.

BANKS-DRAFT

FOR

COLLECTIONZ-INsoLvENcY.-A

bank which

had received a draft for collection, sent it in town to its correspondent
bank at the residence of the drawer, where it was regularly paid when
presented. The latter bank had no account with the bank which sent it
the draft, but was in the habit of remitting the proceeds of drafts every
five days. Before the proceeds of this draft were remitted by the corIt was held that
respondent bank, the first bank became insolvent.
the original owner of the draft could recover the proceeds of the draft
in the hands of the correspondent bank: National Exchange Bank of
Dallas v. Beal, Circuit Court of the United States, District of Massachusetts, May 4, 1892, PUT-AM, J. (5o Fed. Rep., 355).-H. L. C.
CARRIERS OF FREIGHT-DISCRIfINATION-CONTRACT

IN VIOI.A-

TION OF PUBLIC PoLIcY.-Where a railroad company has a fixed rate or
charge for the transportation of property, but it has favored customers
for whom it will transport such property at a lower rate, by first charging
the full price and afterward when the transaction is completed, paying
back a certain proportion thereof as rebate; and the owner of freight
procures it, by an agreement with a favored customer, to be transported
in the name of such favored customer who afterward receives the rebate.
Held: in an action by the owner of the property against the favored
customer for the recovery of the rebate, that the whole transaction was
founded in a violation of public policy and void, and the plaintiff could
not recover: Hanley v. Texas Coal Co., Supreme Court of Kansas, May
7, 1892 (3o Pacific Rep., 14).-J. A. AfcC.
CERTIFIED CHECK-INSOLVEN cY OF BANK--DISCHARGE OF DRAWhRN
OF CHnC.--If the payee or holder of a check in his own behalf, or for
his own benefit, gets it certified instead of having it paid, then the drawer
is discharged from liability on the check if the bank becomes insolvent
before it is paid: Minot v. Russ, SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts.
June 20, 3892, FIELD, C. J. (31 N. E. Rep., 4o6).-H. L. C.
CO-IIMON CARRIERS -

ONNECTING LINES-L-MITING LIABILI TY.-

Where a common carrier receives goods for transportation to a p oint
beyond its own line, the carrier may by contract protect itself against
liability for loss not occurring on its own line: McCam v. International
& G. N. R. Co., Supreme Court of Texas, April I5, 1892, STATO , C. J_
(19S. W. Rep., 547).-H. L. C.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-CROSSING ACCIDENT- Even though
the train which injured the plaintiff was going at a faster rate of speed
within the city limits than that allowed by a city ordinance, yet he cannot recover, if it is shown that had he stopped and looked at a point
thirty-five feet from the crossing where the accident occurred, he might
have avoided the danger: Sala v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. R. Co., Supreme
Court of Iowa, May 27, 1892, ROBINSON, C. J. (52 Northwestern Reporter
664).-J. A.
/7cC.
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COUNTIES-LIABILITY IOR NEGLIGENCE.-Counties are involuntary
corporations, organized as political subdivisions of the State for governmental ptirposes, and are. not liable any more than the State would be
liable for the negligence of its officers or agents, unless made liable by
statute : Board of Commissioners of Vigo County, Supreme Court of
Indiana, June 7, 1892, MILLER, J. (31 N. E. Rep., 531).-H. L. C
COUNTIES-LIABILITY FOR N2FGLIGENCE.-A county is not liable
for personal injuries caused by a defective bridge, unless such liability be
created by statute, either by express words or by necessary implication:
Heigel v. Wichita County, Supreme Court of Texas, April 22, 1892,
GARRIES, J. (I9S. W. Rep., 562).- H. L. C

DEED-UNDUE INFLUENCE-CONFESSOR AND PENITESNT.-When a
person is ignorant or mistaken with respect to his existing legal rights,
and enters into some transaction, the legal effect of which he correctly
apprehends and understands, for the purpose of effecting such assumed
rights, equity will grant its relief, defensive or affirmative, treating the
mistake as analogous, if not identical, with a mistake of fact. Therefore, where the complainant, thinking a paper showed him by the defendant, his confessor, was a revocation of a will made by the complainant's
brother in his favor; and the defendant, knowing the paper had no legal
effect, induced the complainant to execute a trust deed over the property
in favor of the church of which the defendant was pastor: ield: That
equity would interfere in favor of the complainant, not only because of
the defendant's fraud, but also because of the relation he bore to the complainant : Finegan v. Theisen, Supreme Court of MIichigan, June io, 1892
McGRATH, J. (52 N. W. Reporter, 619).-J. A.olIcC.
DEMURRAGE-BERTH-WHEN TO BE FURNISHED IN ABSENCE OF
STIPULATION.-In the absence of any charter stipulation as to time
within which a berth shall be provided for a vessel after her arrival, the
berth must be provided within a reasonable time, or such time as usage
prescribes. By the ordinary usage of the port of New York, twenty-four
hours after notice of arrival is allowed for procuring a berth: The
" Arthur Holme," District Court of the United States, Southern District
of New York, April 26, 1892, BROWN, J. (5o Fed. Rep., 434).-H. L. C.
DEMaURRAGE-LIABILITY OF CONSIGNEE-BILL OF LADIN.-In
the absence of a stipulation in a bill of lading that the consignee shall be
liable for detention of vessel, there is no liability upon his part for detention of the vessel at the port of loading, by the shipper. The latter alone
is liable, and this, is true, although the contract of affreightment with the
master of the vessel may have been made by the consignee: Van Ettere
v. Newton, Court of Appeals of New York, June 7, 1892, PARKER, J. (31
N. E. Rep., 334).-H. L. C.
EJECTMENT-RES JUDICATA-COMITY.-A. sued B. in ejectment
in the State Court of Kansas. While this. action was pending a foreclosure proceeding was instituted concerning the same subject matter in the
United States Circuit Court in which A. and B. were parties defendant.
In the foreclosure proceeding B. filed a cross bill setting up title in himself to the same land, with a prayer that his title be quieted. "A. appeared
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and answered the cross bill, setting up his chain of title. The issue of the
cross bill was found in favor of B., and a decree was entered affirming
and quieting his title to the land. To the declaration in ejectment in the
State Court B. filed a supplemental plea setting up the decree of the Federal Court in bar of the action. Held: An effectual bar upon the principle that while the rule founded upon comity, which subsists between
judicial tribunals, is that the Court which first acquires jurisdiction of the
persons and subject matter of an action will retain the cause until it is
finally determined, yet where the parties, while such suit is pending in
ejectment, submit the controversy therein involved without objection to
another tribunal, having jurisdiction of the subject matter, the judgment
pronounced in the latter Court is binding upon the parties: Gregory v.
Kenyon, Supreme Court of Neb., May 18, 1892 (52 Northwestern Rep.,
685).-J. A. McC.
ELECTION OF AcTIoNs.-Where a contract in writing for the sale of
lumber reserves the title to the lumber in the vendor until the purchase
money is paid, so as to amount, in effect, to a mortgage, the vendor may
elect tb sue for the debt, instead of enforcing the mortgage. Munroe el
al. v. Williams et al., Supreme Court of North Carolina, March 25, 1892
(15 S. E. Rep., 27 9 ).-R. D. S.
EVIDENCE-RESGESTA OPINION.-A railroad brakeman who was
on a platform car was injured while the car was making a running switch.
The engineer of the train walked back to the point where the brakeman
was, reaching there about two minutes after the accident occurred. The
brakeman then made certain statements as to the accident, and the engineer said to him that if the engine had been repaired the night before
the accident would not have occurred. It was held that the statements of
the brakeman as to matters other than those which occurred prior to the
accident were admissible in evidence, but that the statement of the engineer was inadmissible, as it was a mere combination of opinion and a
narrative of events which had occurred prior to the accident: Ohio & M.
Rwy Co. v. Stein, Supreme Court of Indiana, May 14, 1892, ELLICOT, J.
(31 N. R. Rep., I8i).-H. L. C.
INJURIES TO VOLUNTEER-AssumPTIoN OF RISK.-Vhere the head
brakeman of a train called to the plaintiff, a bystander at the station, to
assist in the switching, and While the latter was doing so he received
injuries caused by the movement of certain car trucks which were loaded
on one of the cars, and which were not properly blocked. Held: That the
plaintiff could not recover since the brakeman had no authority to assist
in the switching. The fact that the existing force might have been insufficient to do the work did not, under the circumstances, give him any
implied authority to do so; that if any one on the ground had such authority it was the conductor: Church v. Chicago and St. P. Rway Co.,
Supreme Court of Minnesota, June 22, 1892, MITCHELL, J. (52 Northwestern Reporter, 647).-J. A1. JIcC.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE - DISCRIIfINATION - " PARTY - RATE"
TIcKET.-It is provided by Section I of the Act of February 4, 1887,
that no "unjust and unreasonable charge" shall be made by a common
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carrier for the transportation of passengers between States. Section 2
prohibits "unjust discrimination" by the carrier against any individual,
and Section 3 makes it unlawful for the carrier to give " any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person." A railway company, engaged in interstate business within the terms of the Act,
issued "party-rate" tickets for the transportation of ten or more persons
between points -in different States at a rate lower than that charged an
individual for similar transportation on the same trip. Held: (I) That
the issue of such a ticket did not infringe against any of the sections of
the Act above cited; and (2) that Congress, in adopting the language of
the English Traffic Act in the Act to regulate commerce, must be taken
to have had in contemplation and to have incorporated into the statute
the construction put upon that legislation by the English Courts: Interstate Commerce Commission v. B. & 0. R. R., Mr. Justice BROWN, May
16, 1892 (145 U. S., 263).-G. W. P.
LEASE-IMPLIED COVENANT-PROPERTY AT SUMMER RESORT.In a lease of a completely-furnished dwelling-house at a summer resort
for a single season there is an implied covenant that the house is in a fit
condition for immediate habitation: Ingalls v. Hobbs, Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, May 9, 1892, KNOWLTON, J. (31 N. E. Rep., 286).
L. C.
-H.
LIQUOR LAW-SALE IN VIOLATION OF ORDINANcE-SUIT BY
VENDOR TO RECOVER PRICE-FEDERAL COURTS AND LOCAL LAw.The City of Chicago passed an ordinance making it penal to sell liquor
without a license. A., in violation of the ordinance, sold liquor to B.,
and subsequently brought suit in the Federal Courts for the price. After
the sale, the Supreme Court of Illinois had occasion in another case to
consider for the first time the validity of this ordinance and they decided
in favor of its validity. B. pleaded the ordinance; A. demurred, and the
Circuit Court having sustained the demurrer, it was held (reversing the
Court below) : (I) that since this was a local question, affecting solely the
internal policy of the State and involving no Federal question or principle of general commercial law, the decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in favor of the ordinance should control; (2) that the contract of
sale, made in violation of a valid ordinance, was void and fell under the
ordinary rule that an act done in disobedience to the law creates no right
'of action which a court of justice will enforce: Miller v. Ammon, Mr.
'Justice BREWER, May 16, 1892 (145 U. S., 421).-G. T. P.
LIVERY STABLE-LIEN VOR BOARD OF HoRs.-Where a horse is
left at a livery stable by a bailee who has no authority from the owner of
the horse to place it in such stable, the keeper of the latter acquires no
statutory lien on the animal for the keeping. It is not a question of notice
but a matter of property right, in which the doctrine of caveat eniploi,
applies: Domnan v. Green, Court of Appeals of Texas, June 25, 1892,
DAVIDSON, J. (19 S. W. Rep., 9o9).-. L. C
NEGLIGENCE-SALE OF DEFECTIVE MACHINERY-INJURY TO ONE
NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT.-The vendor of defective machinery
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is not liable for an injury sustained by a servant of the vendor unless
there is evidence to show that the vendor had knowledge of its defective
character: Heizer v. Kingsland & Douglass Manufacturing Company,
Supreme Court of Mlissouri, May 23, 1892, BLACK, J. (i 9 S. IV. Rep.,
63o).-H. L. C.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS--NDORSEMENT' AFTER MATURITYRIGHTS OF ENDORSEE.-When a negotiable instrument is endorsed after
maturity by one to whom it was transferred before maturity, the endorsee
after maturity occupies the same position as was occupied by his endorser, and no defence which could not have been made against the note
in the hands of the latter can be made against it in a suit by the endorsee
after maturity: Matson v. Alley, Supreme Court of Illinois, May 12,
1892, SCHOFIELD, J. (31 N. B. Rep., 419.)-H. C. L.
PARTNERSHIP-EFFECT ov AGREEMENT To SHARE PRoFITS.-A.
loaned money to a firm under an agreement by which he was to receive,
in addition to interest, one-tenth of the net profits of the firm over and
above a certain sum. A. received annual accounts of profit and loss, and
actually participated in profits. A. died, and a firm-creditor sued his
executor on a partnership note. At the trial the Court below granted a
non-suit. Held: that those persons only are partners who contribute
either proj~erty or money to carry oil a joint business for their common
benefit, and who own and share the profits thereof in certain proportions;
that in this case a jury would not have been justified in inferring on the
part of A. either "actual participation in the profits as principal," or
that he authorized the business to be carried on in part for him or on
his behalf; and that, therefore, the Court below committed no error in
non-suiting the plaintiff: Meehan v. Valentine, Mr. Justice GRAY, May
i6, 1892 (145 U. S., 611.)-G. W. P.
POLICY OF INSURAINCE-BENEFICIARIES-

CHILDREN. -WVhen

a

policy of insurance upon the life of a man is made for the sole use of his
wife, if living, in conformity with the statute, and if not living then to
her children or their guardians, if one of the children and the wife sue.
cessively die during the life time of the insured, upon his death the entire
amount of the insurance is to be paid to the children who survive the
insured; the representatives of the deceased daughter take nothing, as
her interest under the policy is contingent upon her surviving the insured: Valsh v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., Court of Appeals of New
York, May 24, 1892, GRAY, J. (31 N. E. Rep., 228.)-H. L. C.
RAILROAD MORTGAGE-DISTRIBUTION UPON FORECLOSURE-JUDG-MENT FOR LAND TAKEN-PRIORITY.-A railroad company, whose line

was partly constructed, issued certain bonds which were secured by a
mortgage upon its line. Subsequent to the creation of this mortgage
and the sale of the bonds, the company constructed another portion of
contemplated line. Certain owners of land abutting upon this portion of
the line brought suit against the company for consequential damages
arising out of the construction and operation of the line. It was held
that judgments upon these suits were entitled to priority of payment
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over the bondholders: Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Heiss,
Supreme Court of Illinois, May 9, 1892, SHoPE, J. (31 N. E. Rep., 138).H. L. C.
R FoRmATIo.N OF NOTE.-Plaintiff held a note, signed "Herndon
Natural Gas Co. F. A. Percival, President; A. Hastie, Secretary," given
for the exclusive benefit of the company. In executing it P. and H. intended to bind the company only, and the plaintiff had no reason to
believe otherwise. Held: in an action against P. and H., the defendants
were entitled to have the note reformed to express the true contract of
the parties, and parol evidence was admissible to establish such contract:
Lee v. Percival, el al., Supreme Court of Iowa, May 26, 1692, ROBINsON,
C. J. (52 N. W. Rep., 543).-J. A. lfeC.
REcISION OF CONTRACT OF SALE-TENDER OF PURCHASE MONEY.
A suit for a recision of contract of sale on the ground of fraud on the
part of the purchaser cannot be maintained where the purchase money
paid has not been returned nor a tender made, although the vendor may
have expended the amount received prior to the discovery of the fraud,
and is unable to raise the amount necessary to make the tender. This
defect is not cured by an allegation that if the contract should be rescinded that defendant wial have in his hands property of the plaintiff
largely exceeding in value the amount of the purchase money : Rigdon
v. Walcott, Supreme Court of Illinois, May 12, 1892, BAILY, J. (31 N. E.
Rep.).-H. L. C.
REMARKS OF CouNsEL.-When the prosecuting attorney, during the
trial of a criminal proceeding, challenges the counsel for the defendant
to explain the evidence upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that
of guilt, and makes use of the latter's failure to do so in argument before
the jury, such conduct cannot be objected to as tending to shift the burden of proving innocence on the defendant: People v. Hall, Supreme
Court of California, May 28, 1892, per curiamr (3o Pacific Reporter, I).
-J. A. McC.
\WRIT OF PROHIBITION-DIsCRrTION OF COURT-WHEN EXERCISED.
-In
this country the writ of prohibition is not granted in any c.dt exz
debilo justiliae,but rests in the sound discretion of the Court, to be
favorably exercised only when the ordinary forms of relief are insufficient,
and never if the complaining party has another adequate remedy at law.
The only inquiries permitted upon prohibition are whether the inferior
tribunal is exercising a jurisdiction it does not possess, or, having jurisdiction over the subject-matter, has exceeded its legitimate powers. But
an ordinance which provides that the license and the money paid therefor shall be and remain forfeited, althoughl an acquittal should take
place upon appeal and trial de novo, and prescribes both fine and imprisonment as penalties for its violation, is void, as being oppressive and
unreasonab.le, and in excess of the statutory power to enforce ordinances
"by a proper fine, imprisonment, or other penalties ;" and it is therefore
proper to award a writ of prohibition to prevent a Court from proceeding
to enforce it: Mclnerney v. City of Denver, el al., Supreme Court of
Colorado, February i5, 1892 (29 Pac. Rep., 516).-R. D. S.

